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Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage?
Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage
Advocacy from the History
of Polygamy

CHESHIRE CALHOUN*

I. INTRODUCTION
In United States history, there have been four important bars to civil
marriage. First, during the period of U.S. slavery, marriages between
slaves, though informally celebrated, were not legally recognized.1 The
bar to civil marriage between slaves was part of slaves’ general legal
incapacity to enter into contracts, and was not an expression of social
disapproval of slave marriages.2 Indeed, slaveholders sometimes promoted
informal marriage unions between slaves.3 The three other marriage
bars, however, specifically targeted relationships that were the subjects
of intense social disapproval and were treated by lawmakers as
dangerous to societal order.
Bars to marriage across racial lines—particularly between whites and
blacks, but in the West, also between whites and Asians or Native
Americans—were first erected in the eighteenth century and proliferated
* Charles A. Dana Professor of Philosophy, Colby College, Waterville, Maine.
1. Nancy F. Cott, Giving Character to Our Whole Civil Polity: Marriage and the
Public Order in the Late Nineteenth Century, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN’S HISTORY:
NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS 111 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995).
2. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 35
(2000).
3. Cott, supra note 1, at 107, 111.
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after abolition.4 Forty-one states barred interracial marriages at some
point in their history.5 These antimiscegenation laws were finally
invalidated in 1967 in the Supreme Court case of Loving v. Virginia.6
Bars to polygamous marriages were targeted at the Mormon practice
of plural marriage in the Utah territory, and were first erected under the
Morrill Act of 1862 that made bigamy a federal offense.7 Shortly
thereafter, the federal government further penalized polygamists by
making cohabitation an offense, by taking away Utah women’s right to
vote, by making the affirmation that one is not a polygamist a condition
of voter registration for men, by denying polygamists the right to serve
in public office or on juries, by requiring women in polygamous
marriages to testify against their husbands in court, and ultimately by
seizing the assets of the Mormon church.8 In addition, in the nineteenth
century, every state made bigamy a crime.9 The constitutionality of this
marriage bar was challenged on First Amendment freedom of religion
grounds in 1878, in Reynolds v. United States.10 In said case, the
Supreme Court upheld the bar on polygamy,11 and that ruling still stands
today.
Legal bars to same-sex marriage are of substantially more recent
vintage, having largely arisen within the last decade. Bars to same-sex
marriage began to proliferate at both the state and federal level only after
same-sex couples began suing in court for the right to marry under
marriage laws that did not specify the gender of the spouses.12 As of
November 2004, thirty-eight states explicitly defined marriage as
between one man and one woman, and seventeen had incorporated those
definitions into their constitutions.13 The 1996 Defense of Marriage Act
defined marriage for federal purposes as between one man and one
woman.14 It also qualified the Full Faith and Credit Clause, relieving
states of the requirement to recognize marriages legally performed in

4. COTT, supra note 2, at 99; Cott, supra note 1, at 118–19.
5. Cott, supra note 1, at 118.
6. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 2 (1967).
7. COTT, supra note 2, at 112.
8. Cott, supra note 1, at 118–19; Nancy Rosenblum, Democratic Sex: Reynolds v.
U.S., Sexual Relations, and Community, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON
LAW AND NATURE 76–77 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
9. COTT, supra note 2, at 112.
10. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878).
11. Id. at 166, 168.
12. See, e.g., David Orgon Coolidge, The Question of Marriage, in HOMOSEXUALITY
AND AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 200, 204–08 (Christopher Wolfe ed., 1999).
13. National Gay and Lesbian Task Force Marriage Map, http://www.thetaskforce.
org/community/marriagecenter.cfm (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).
14. Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996).
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another state.15 More recently, some have advocated a Federal Marriage
Amendment that would make the monogamous heterosexual nature of
marriage a matter of constitutional definition.16
What the law recognizes as civil marriage has not, however, been
determinative of how citizens understand the social institution of
marriage. Slaves did marry without legal sanction.17 Nineteenth-century
members of the Latter-day Saints (LDS) protested the federal regulation
of polygamy by continuing to practice plural marriage, either openly or
underground;18 and today members of some fundamentalist offshoots of
Mormonism practice polygamy in the absence of state recognition of
their marriages.19 Antimiscegenation laws did not prevent interracial
couples from constructing lives together, nor do same-sex marriage bars
prevent gays and lesbians from publicly celebrating their unions, or
religious communities from recognizing them.
The central issue raised by marriage bars is thus not whether the state
should permit nonmonogamous and nonheterosexual marriages, but
whether the state should support nonmonogamous and nonheterosexual
marriages by assigning them the legal status of civil marriage.20 With
the legal status of civil marriage comes immigration rights, the right not
to testify against one’s spouse, social security survivor’s benefits,
inheritance without a will, and the right to give proxy consent. With the
status of civil marriage also comes coverage under divorce laws and thus
legal determination of property distribution, alimony payment, and child
custody and support. Informally, having the status of civil marriage can
also mean access to such benefits as a partner’s health insurance plan,
reduced membership fees for the spouse, and access to family rates.
Given that neither the polygamous marriages of some citizens nor the
same-sex marriages of others are currently recognized by the state, one
15. Id. § 2.
16. The nineteenth-century antipolygamy campaign also produced (unsuccessful)
demands for a constitutional amendment that would settle, with finality, the nation’s
commitment to heterosexual monogamy as its sole marriage form.
17. COTT, supra note 2, at 34–35.
18. JESSIE L. EMBRY, MORMON POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES: LIFE IN THE PRINCIPLE, 17–27
(1987); IRWIN ALTMAN & JOSEPH GINAT, POLYGAMOUS FAMILIES IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY 43–44 (1996).
19. See generally ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 18.
20. This requires some qualification. Because cohabitation was made an
offense—sometimes a felony offense, as in the 1935 Utah law—polygamy ended up not
only being not supported in the law but coercively prohibited. IRWIN & GINAT, supra
note 18, at 46.
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might have expected that advocates of same-sex marriage rights would
make common cause with advocates of polygamous marriage rights.
That has not been the case. With few exceptions, advocates of same-sex
marriage have exercised a vigorous silence about the other marriage bar
currently in effect, namely the bar to polygamy.21 There are two main
reasons for that silence. Opponents of same-sex marriage often invoke
polygamy in order to make reductio arguments against expanding the
definition of marriage to include same-sex couples: If the definition of
marriage is treated as something that is not fixed, then what, they ask, is
to prevent the definition of marriage from being expanded to include not
only same-sex marriages, but also polygamous marriages (and incestuous
marriages and marriages with animals, etc.)? In this way, social hostility
to polygamy is invoked as a reason not to permit same-sex marriage.
Thus, advocates of same-sex marriage have found it strategically unwise
to press an analogy between the bars to same-sex and polygamous
marriage.
The political expediency of not associating same-sex marriage with
polygamous marriage explains the silence of those at the front of the
political fray. It does not fully explain why academic philosophers and
legal theorists have maintained a similar silence about the “other”
marriage bar. The principle reason appears to be a conviction that same-sex
marriages and polygamous marriages are substantially disanalogous. While
same-sex marriages challenge the traditional gender structure of
marriage, polygamy is more likely to exaggerate the gender hierarchy
within marriage and is thus incompatible with a liberal democracy that
values women’s equality. Same-sex marriage advocates thus routinely
dismiss the issue of polygamous marriage as irrelevant to the question of
whether the bar to same-sex marriage should be lifted. In particular,
they insist that polygamous marriages are sufficiently socially dangerous
that extending marriage rights to same-sex couples will not put us on a
slippery slope toward recognizing polygamous marriages.22
Despite all this, the refusal to regard the marriage bar to polygamy as
a significant political issue bears closer scrutiny. In what follows, this
Article will be arguing that more careful attention to the historical
practice of polygamy strengthens the case for same-sex marriage; and
attention to the similarities between the social issues at stake in the
21. But see GORDON ALBERT BABST, LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, MARRIAGE,
SEXUAL ORIENTATION: A CONTEMPORARY CASE FOR DIS-ESTABLISHMENT 87–89
(2002) (arguing that there is a critical legal analogy between the bars to same-sex,
interracial, and polygamous marriage insofar as legal reasoning in all three cases appeals
to alleged Christian values and views of divine purpose).
22. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 148–49 (1996).

AND
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antipolygamy campaign and the same-sex marriage campaign can
productively complicate our sense of what the fundamental issues are in
the same-sex marriage debate. Finally, this Article will suggest that it is
not altogether clear that legal recognition of polygamous marriage is
incompatible with a liberal, democratic, and egalitarian society. The
proper response to same-sex marriage opponents’ reductio argument may
23
instead be, “And indeed, why not also polygamy?”
II. COUNTERING APPEALS TO A MARRIAGE TRADITION
So let us turn first to the ways that more explicit attention to polygamy
might help to build a stronger case for same-sex marriage. The same-sex
marriage debate is a debate between expansionists, who argue that the
traditional conception of marriage enshrined in law should be expanded to
include same-sex couples, and traditionalists, who insist on the value of
preserving the traditional conception of marriage as between one man
and one woman. Traditionalists argue that citizens will find laws and
public policies reasonable only if they are consistent with citizens’ core
values.24 It is thus always relevant for the law to take into account “our”
particular moral traditions and to be extremely cautious of legal
innovations that might undermine core social values. In assessing the
desirability of extending civil marriage to same-sex couples, traditionalists
point out that it is particularly important to bear in mind the two
thousand-year-old tradition of understanding marriage as the union of
one man and one woman, a tradition that includes Judeo-Christian,
Given the
Western European, and American cultural histories.25
extraordinary importance attached to heterosexual marriage and the
absence of any comparable tradition of recognizing same-sex unions,
traditionalists conclude that the state ought not expand the current legal
definition of marriage.
One way of challenging the traditionalist’s argument is to challenge
the propriety of premising our laws on the majority’s moral or religious
values, no matter how longstanding, given the fact that ours is a liberal
democracy designed to protect individuals’ liberty to pursue a plurality
of ways of life. Another way of challenging the traditionalists’ argument
23.
24.

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
CARLOS A. BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS: AN EXPLORATION IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 139–45 (2003).
25. John Witte, Jr., The Tradition of Traditional Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND
SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 47–49 (Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds., 2003).
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is to challenge the truth of their claims about the Judeo-Christian marriage
tradition. In this vein, one option is to observe that there has been at
least a minor thread within the Judeo-Christian tradition of acknowledging
same-sex unions. John Boswell’s rediscovery of the union ceremonies
for monks performed by the Roman Catholic Church in the Middle Ages
is by now well known.26 In the 1800s, so-called Boston marriages
between two women emerged as a recognized cultural phenomenon in
the U.S. which was not, at the time, regarded as incompatible with a
Judeo-Christian tradition.27 Finally, at present, a variety of religious
denominations, including Unitarians, the United Church of Christ,
Reform Judaism, the Society of Friends, and Episcopalians recognize
same-sex unions.28
These facts, however, are unlikely to move traditionalists given that
most of the evidence is from very recent developments within Christian
and Jewish communities; and those religious communities are doing
exactly what traditionalists object to the law doing—adopting policies
that fly in the face of a millennia-old tradition of heterosexual
monogamous marriage.29
A more powerful challenge might be framed by inviting traditionalists
to consider whether the Judeo-Christian tradition will support both of the
marriage bars they wish to sustain: the bar to same-sex marriage and the
bar to polygamy. If it will not, then the Judeo-Christian “tradition” may
be a dangerous tool for same-sex marriage opponents to invoke.
Polygamy has, in fact, a lengthy history within the Judeo-Christian
tradition—beginning with the polygamous marriages of the Old
Testament patriarchs.30 Nowhere in either the Hebrew Bible or the New
Testament is polygamy forbidden.31 Indeed, some European Jews
practiced polygamy until the eleventh century; and even then the ban on
polygamy was adopted only to avoid Christian persecution in France and
Germany. Martin Luther, while not endorsing polygamy as an ideal or
pervasive practice, nevertheless observed that polygamy does not
contradict the Scripture and so cannot be prohibited by Christianity.32
26. JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE 218–21 (1994).
27. LILLIAN FADERMAN, SURPASSING THE LOVE OF MEN: ROMANTIC FRIENDSHIP
AND LOVE BETWEEN WOMEN FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT 16, 190, 208–13
(1981).
28. BABST, supra note 21, at 83 n.14.
29. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
30. ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 18, at 41–42; PHILIP L. KILBRIDE, PLURAL
MARRIAGE FOR OUR TIMES: A REINVENTED OPTION? 59–66 (1994).
31. EMBRY, supra note 18, at 4–5. But note 1 Timothy 3:2,12, where “overseers”
and “deacons” in the church are to be “husband of but one wife” (personal
correspondence, Steve Palmquist).
32. I confess, indeed, I cannot forbid anyone who wishes to marry several wives,
nor is that against Holy Scripture; however, I do not want that custom
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And within Catholicism, the question of whether polygamy was
acceptable in exceptional circumstances was not finally settled until the
Council of Trent in 1563.33
Polygamy has had an especially significant place in U.S. social life
after Joseph Smith’s 1843 revelation that members of the Church of
Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints (the LDS church) should begin
practicing what they called “plural marriages” patterned on Old
Testament patriarchal polygamy. The LDS church was an enormously
powerful religious community in the nineteenth century. Occupying the
Utah territory, the Church planned to expand into a territory that
included parts of California, Oregon, Arizona, New Mexico, Colorado,
Wyoming, and all of Nevada and Utah.34 The Church set up its own
legal system, including legally recognizing plural marriages and granting
divorces and property settlements.35 The political and economic power
of the Mormon Church made credible its aim to break away from the
United States and motivated a series of federal acts designed to rein in
the Utah territory, including the disenfranchisement of polygamists and
seizure of the Church’s finances.36 Under this federal pressure, the LDS
church formally repudiated plural marriage in 1890, but fundamentalist
offshoots continue to practice plural marriage today.37 One study
estimates membership at twenty to fifty thousand.38
In short, polygamous marriage cannot be dismissed as a negligible blip in
an otherwise consistent tradition of heterosexual monogamous marriage.
On the contrary, polygamy is very much part of a millenias-long pluralist
introduced among Christians among whom it is proper to pass up even
things that are permissible, to avoid scandal and to live respectably, which
Paul everywhere enjoins.
KILBRIDE, supra note 30, at 63 (quoting Luther’s correspondence).
33. Id. at 64.
34. Rosenblum, supra note 8, at 72–73.
35. Brigham Young issued 1645 divorces during his presidency of the Church.
JOAN SMYTH IVERSEN, THE ANTIPOLYGAMY CONTROVERSY IN U.S. WOMEN’S
MOVEMENTS, 1880–1925: A DEBATE ON THE AMERICAN HOME 59 (1997).
36. President Hayes observed that “[l]aws must be enacted which will take from
the Mormon Church its temporal power. Mormonism as a sectarian idea is nothing, but
as a system of government it is our duty to deal with it as an enemy of our institutions
and its supporters and leaders as criminals.” Rosenblum, supra note 34, at 75 (quoting
Hayes).
37. See ALTMAN & GINAT, supra note 18. Two prominent religious communities
that accept the principle of “plural marriage” are located in Hildale, Utah and Colorado
City, Arizona. Id. at 50–51.
38. Id. at 2.
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Judeo-Christian tradition of marriage.39 Traditionalists thus enter quite
perilous territory when they invoke the Judeo-Christian tradition as a
reason for rejecting same-sex civil marriage. The same tradition that
traditionalists believe justifies limiting civil marriage to heterosexual
relationships, would also justify extending civil marriage to polygamous
relationships. Such an implication is likely to seriously undermine the
appeal, for traditionalists, of using tradition as a guide to marriage
policy. Moreover, given how pervasive appeals to tradition are in the
same-sex marriage debate, marriage rights advocates stand to gain
quite a lot by reminding those who would appeal to tradition that it
does not support state and federal definitions of marriage as not only
heterosexual, but between one man and one woman.
III. FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STATE FORM OF MARRIAGE
More importantly, attending to the details of the nineteenth-century
polygamy debate throws into relief the larger issues—both social and
legal—that are at stake when marriage bars are erected and subsequently
challenged. Neither the polygamy debates of the nineteenth century nor
the same-sex marriage debates of today were just about a minority
sexual practice. They were also debates about how to respond to the
failure of heterosexual monogamous marriage to deliver the social
benefits that warrant the state’s legally recognizing these marriages in
the first place. Should heterosexual monogamy as a marital form be
protected? Or should alternative marital forms be granted social and
legal standing? Both plural marriage advocates and same-sex marriage
advocates argued that state support should instead be given to a different
definition of marriage—polygamous or gender-neutral.
Rising divorce rates in both the late nineteenth and late twentieth
centuries40 called into question the cultural ideal of a marriage as what
Karen Struening has called a “multipurpose association.”41 Marriages
are supposed to satisfy a plurality of individuals’ needs, including needs
for sexual and emotional intimacy, reproduction, childrearing, and the
care of adults’ material needs. The expectation that marriages will meet
individuals’ sexual and emotional needs encourages individuals to
dissolve their marriages when those needs are not met, and to search for
39. It is important to bear in mind that our U.S. tradition occurs within a
multination state whose traditions include those of Indian nations for whom monogamy
was not always the defining form of marriage and which sometimes recognized unions
between same-sexed persons. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 27–30; COTT, supra note
2, at 25.
40. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 106–07; COTT, supra note 2, at 105–07, 203.
41. KAREN STRUENING, NEW FAMILY VALUES: LIBERTY, EQUALITY, DIVERSITY 85
(2002).
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new partners42—hence liberalization of divorce law and a rise in the
divorce rate in both periods. The failure of many marriages to endure,
however, is at odds with the expectation that marriages will provide
stable contexts for the rearing of children and the economic support of
adults—expectations that require long-term commitment to staying in
the marriage.
In the nineteenth century, the polygamy debates centered on the
question of what the best social response should be to the failure of
conventional marriage to serve as a “multipurpose association.” Moral
reform movements assumed that the problem had more to do with the
individuals within marriages than with the form of marriage itself.43
Moral reformers thus argued that conventional marriage should remain
the normative form of marriage but be shored up with social reform and
legal regulation. They focused energy on curbing male lust, eliminating
prostitution, and reducing the number of unwed mothers. Controlling
the rate of divorce was also linked in the public’s imagination to
controlling the Mormon practice of polygamy, because relatively liberal
divorce laws were condemned for permitting “serial polygamy” under
conventional marriage.44 Many called for legal steps to be taken to
check both serial polygamy and Mormon plural marriage.45 As a result,
the demand for federal control of Mormon polygamy was conjoined to a
request for a federal marriage law that would control the rate of divorce
within monogamous marriage.46
On the other side, polygamy advocates argued that an alternative
marital form was more likely to meet with success. Mormon women, for
example, argued that plural marriage promised to solve the social
problems created by the failure of monogamous companionate marriage
to supply both adequate sexual satisfaction for men and a stable
reproductive environment for women and children.47 Sharing their

42. Id.
43. Julie Dunfey, ‘Living the Principle’ of Plural Marriage: Mormon Women,
Utopia, and Female Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century, 10 FEMINIST STUDIES 523, 527
(1984).
44. Rosenblum, supra note 8, at 75. According to Joan Iversen, social critics
charged divorce rates in New England with creating “polygamy in New England.”
IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 106.
45. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 107.
46. Id. at 106–07, 219–20.
47. For example, the Utah women’s journal, The Women’s Exponent, “cited stories
of infanticide, alcoholic and abusive husbands, desertion, divorce, and prostitution as
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monogamous sisters’ assumption that a large part of the problem was
due to men’s higher sex drive, Mormon women argued that if only men
were allowed to have plural wives, they would not be motivated to use
prostitutes (or presumably, to divorce), and thus fewer women would be
degraded by work as prostitutes and fewer would suffer the hardships of
bearing children out of wedlock or of being left without adequate
economic support.48 Moreover, given the scarcity of “worthy men”
and the surfeit of “pure women,” plural marriage would guarantee
that no woman who wished to be married would have to marry
beneath herself.49
Twentieth-century debates over same-sex marriage have been very
much about the same question of what to do about conventional
marriage’s failure to serve all its intended purposes. Opponents of
same-sex marriage see same-sex marriage as the last straw in a larger
social process of decaying social commitment to committed, long-term,
sexually faithful, monogamous relationships and as the culmination of a
social shift toward basing relationships purely on self-indulgent personal
preferences. The social consequence of this collapse of conventional
marriage is a more than fifty percent divorce rate,50 a reduction in the
percentage of adults who are married,51 the escalation of female-headed
households, and the growing number of children born to never-married
women.52 These trends are also blamed for putting pressure on the
welfare system and producing a generation of children who have failed
to internalize values of loyalty, commitment, and self-restraint.53 Legal
recognition of same-sex marriage, on this view, is objectionable not so
much because it is same-sex, but because same-sex marriage symbolizes
a kind of last straw in the social assault on the traditional conception of
marriage.
Thus, in the twenty-first-century marriage debate, as in the
nineteenth-century marriage debate, one side argues that conventional
marriage should remain the normative form of marriage but be shored
up with social and legal reforms. Proposed reforms today include
conducting abstinence education in schools, reducing payments to
unwed welfare mothers, reintroducing fault-based divorce, and
improving tax breaks for married couples. Protecting the social status of
evidence of the corruption of the larger society.” Dunfey, supra note 43, at 527–28; see
also IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 63.
48. Dunfey, supra note 43, at 528, 530.
49. Id. at 523–26, 528–29.
50. COTT, supra note 2, at 203.
51. The percentage of adults who are married dropped from 75% in the early
1970s to 56% in the late 1990s. Id. at 203.
52. Id. at 204.
53. Id.
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marriage as a unique and sacred institution by withholding legal
recognition of same-sex marriage becomes part of this “shoring up”
strategy.
The other side argues that alternative marital and family forms are
more likely to meet with success—especially if they do not burden a
single relationship with meeting the full range of individuals’ sexual,
emotional, reproductive, childrearing and material needs. For example,
the growing practice of parenting outside of a marriage—whether as
a result of divorce or of not marrying in the first place—detaches
reproductive and childrearing relationships from sex and romantic love.
The caretaking networks that emerged in response to the AIDS epidemic
similarly detached adult caretaking relationships from those that satisfy
sexual and romantic needs. Advocacy of same-sex marriage becomes
part of this splitting off of the romantic and sexual from the reproductive
and caretaking functions of conventional marriage. This is not to say
that those joined via same-sex unions do not produce and rear children.
It is to say that the advocacy of same-sex marriage rights has primarily
invoked the importance of individuals being able to satisfy their
romantic, companionate, and sexual needs.
In short, both the latter half of the nineteenth century and the past
decade have been important moments in our collective social life for
thinking about what sorts of relationships might best satisfy individuals’
complex needs for emotional and sexual intimacy, procreation, childrearing,
and adult care-taking—and for reflecting on the ways that the state
should, and should not, be involved in protecting those relationships.
Perhaps most crucially, these historical moments also presented the
opportunity to take up fundamental political questions concerning
marriage: Should there be a state supported form of marriage? If so,
should there be more than one state supported form of marriage? Or
should the state simply enforce whatever contracts into which individuals
voluntarily enter?
Because civil marriage has always been an uneasy merging of a public
status with a private contract, it is appropriate to ask these fundamental
questions about whether and how the state should be involved in
marriages.54 Civil marriages are contracts insofar as they are entered
into only by voluntary consent. Civil marriage is a public status insofar
54. See id. at 11, 101–02, and BABST, supra note 21, at 16–21, for discussions of
the contract and status features of civil marriage.
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as individuals are not free to determine the terms of the marital
contract—who may enter a marriage, what obligations spouses have, or
the terms for dissolving a marriage. These features are all set by the
state.
The contract and status aspects of civil marriage pull against each
other.55 To the extent that we think of civil marriage as a private
contract, voluntarily entered into for the purpose of satisfying some
combination of the individual’s particular sexual, emotional, caretaking,
and reproductive needs, we are inevitably pulled toward the idea that if
there is freedom of contract, then we should have the freedom to devise
whatever marriage contract with whatever partner or partners we please
and to determine the conditions of dissolution of the marriage.56 This,
one might think, is as things should be in a liberal society that permits
citizens to pursue their own conception of the good so long as doing so
does not infringe on others’ rights, even if that conception is a minority
or unpopular one. From the viewpoint of liberal theory, the state should
remain neutral with respect to competing conceptions of what marriage
is and of how individuals’ needs for sex and emotional intimacy,
material support in daily life, reproduction, and childrearing are to be
met. The state fails to be neutral when it chooses one particular form of
relationship to support. If we focus on the contractual, consent-based
nature of marriage, the central question is: “What legal protections and
supports, if any, should the state provide for the plurality of purposes
that individuals might have for entering into marital contracts?”
On the other hand, to the extent that we think of marriage as a public
status, like citizenship or eligibility for public office, we move in the
direction of a less pluralistic definition of civil marriage. We think of
civil marriage not as something that individuals define for themselves,
but as a relationship that the state defines for all of us: civil marriage is
state marriage. On this view, it is not up to individuals, with their varied
preferences and values, to determine what will qualify as the state’s form
of marriage. Instead, the state must accept or reject the various
candidates for the state’s form of marriage—monogamous, polygamous,
heterosexual, same-sex—according to whether those relationships are
believed to contribute to the social good, not the individual’s private
55. Nancy Rosenblum pursues this tension as it manifests itself in liberal
democratic thought. On the one hand, a privacy model of marriage pulls in a libertarian
direction; on the other hand, the view that marriages and families are first schools of
justice pulls in the direction of a more restrictive conception of marriage. Rosenblum,
supra note 8, at 80–81.
56. See generally Will Kymlicka, Rethinking the Family, 20 PHILOSOPHY AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 77 (1991) (reviewing SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE
FAMILY (1989)), for an elaboration of this contractual view.
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good. That social good may be the cultivation in adults of key social
virtues such as self-sacrifice, loyalty, and sexual self-restraint. Or it may
be the training of adults and children in democratic virtues of equal
respect. Or it may be the preservation of a foundational social tradition,
such as the Judeo-Christian tradition of marriage. Monogamous,
polygamous, heterosexual, and same-sex relationships then get evaluated
and accepted or rejected as candidates for the state’s form of marriage
according to whether those relationships are believed to contribute to the
social good. For example, Justice Waite, who rendered the Court’s
opinion in Reynolds,57 assumed a status conception of marriage when he
affirmed that “it is within the legitimate scope of the power of every
civil government to determine whether polygamy or monogamy shall be
the law of social life under its dominion.”58 He rejected polygamy as the
law of social life on the grounds that it is more allied with despotism
than democracy and thus is contrary to the social good.
Civil marriage’s peculiar hybridization of private contract and public
status means that social campaigns to revise the terms of civil
marriage—by liberalizing divorce laws, offering an option of covenant
marriage, or extending marriage rights to formerly excluded individuals—are
often ambiguous between two claims. On the one hand, revisionist
campaigns might be viewed as pressing the state toward a more
genuinely contractual and pluralist conception of marriage. These campaigns
might aim to disestablish a state form of marriage in order to afford
individuals greater liberty to pursue their own conceptions of the good.59
On the other hand, one might see revisionist campaigns as pressing the
state toward simply a different status conception of civil marriage.
What is striking about the pro-polygamy and pro-same-sex marriage
campaigns is that neither campaign was committed to fully pluralizing
marital and familial forms by insisting that the law be neutral with
respect to competing conceptions of how people can best satisfy their
needs for emotional and sexual intimacy, care-taking, reproduction, and
childrearing. Instead the debate focused on which one of rivaling legal
definitions of marriage—monogamy or polygamy, monogamous

57. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 153 (1878).
58. Id. at 166.
59. Nancy F. Cott argues that an array of changes in marriage and divorce law as
well as the nonprosecution of Mormon fundamentalist polygamy indicate the
disestablishment of (a single form of) marriage. COTT, supra note 2, at 200–15.

1035

CALHOUN.DOC

8/7/2019 12:41 PM

heterosexual or monogamous gender-neutral marriage—should define
the state’s marital form.
In the nineteenth century, polygamy advocates pursued the recognition
of plural marriage as the state’s marital form. Monogamous marriage
had failed adequately to deliver the goods it purported to produce—to
combine romantic love with a stable context for childrearing, to regulate
male sexuality, and to provide women with adequate economic support
and children with fathers. Polygamy was being offered up by the LDS
church not just as their preferred marriage form given their particular
religious beliefs, but as the marriage form that would best secure the
social goods with which a state should concern itself. Justice Waite, in
his Reynolds opinion, was exactly right to see that the question at issue
was which form of marriage—monogamy or polygamy—was to be the
state’s marriage.60
In recent decades, same-sex marriage advocates have pursued
recognition of non-gender-specific monogamy not just as their preferred
marriage form but as the state’s marital form. Heterosexual marriage
has failed to prove that it can uniquely deliver important goods such
as long-term commitment and satisfaction of individuals’ needs for
emotional intimacy. Unlike polygamy advocates, same-sex marriage
advocates may not be able to argue that same-sex marriages are more
likely to deliver the goods—with the one possible exception of gender
equality within marriage—but advocates are positioned to argue that
same-sex marriages would do at least as well as the currently flagging
institution of heterosexual marriage. Thus, the state form of marriage
should be redefined in gender-neutral terms. What is to be retained,
however, is the existence of a singular definition of marriage, which,
while gender-neutral, still presumes the monogamous and companionate
form of conventional marriage. Thus, marriage rights advocates are
often quick in the face of the challenge, “And what about polygamy?” to
affirm their resistance to any more wide-ranging reform of marriage.61
As Judith Butler notes, with some disenchantment, the same-sex
marriage debate is not just a debate over whose relationship will be
legitimated and supported by the state, but also over whose desire will
become the state’s desire.62
In short, despite their apparent radicalism, both the pro-polygamy and
pro-same-sex marriage campaigns have been marked by an antipluralist
and exclusionary conception of marriage. Neither debate seized the
60.
61.
62.

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 148–49.
Judith Butler, Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?, 13 DIFFERENCES: A
JOURNAL OF FEMINIST CULTURAL STUDIES 14, 22 (2002).
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opportunity to question the desirability of defining a single form of state
marriage. Both simply assumed that the state should support marriage
and only one form of marriage. However, maintaining a single state
definition of marriage is at odds with the fundamental premises of a
liberal political society, with the private, contractual aspect of marriage,
and with satisfying individuals’ multiple relational needs. Thus, the state
would do better to move toward a more pluralistic conception of personal
relationships; and it might do so in one of two ways. On the one hand, we
might adopt a fully contractual approach to emotional, sexual, childrearing,
and adult support relationships.63 In that case, the state would simply
enforce the terms of the contracts agreed upon by the contracting parties.
On the other hand, the state might remain in the business of licensing
marriages or other relational forms. But in a pluralist liberal society, one
would expect that there would be a plurality of marriage or relational
options rather than a single state form of marriage. The U.S. is in fact
moving in the direction of creating various packages of rights designed
to protect and support a plurality of relational choices. On offer already
are domestic partnerships (California, New Jersey), heterosexual civil
marriage, same-sex civil unions (Vermont, Connecticut), same-sex marriage
(Massachusetts), and covenant marriage (Arkansas, Arizona, Louisiana).64
Same-sex marriage advocacy loses much of its radical (and plain old
liberal) potential by refusing to take up the banner of disestablishing a
single state form of marriage. Disestablishing a single state form of
marriage would in turn, of course, open the doors to state recognition of
polygamous marriages.
IV. WHO’S AFRAID OF POLYGAMOUS MARRIAGE: POLYGAMY AND
GENDER EQUALITY
Up to this point in our discussion, polygamous marriage has remained
safely in the past. If the state is to support the plurality of individuals’
relational choices, and if one significant relational choice is of plural
spouses, then the question of polygamy must be confronted.
Why not polygamy? John Stuart Mill famously asserted in On Liberty
that polygamy was “a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the
63. See generally Kymlicka, supra note 56.
64. See, e.g., 2000 Vt. Acts & Resolves H. 847, § 3 (codified as amended at VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2002)), 2005 Conn. Acts 05-10 (Reg. Sess.) (effective Oct. 1,
2005).
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community [namely women], and an emancipation of the other from
reciprocity of obligation towards them.”65 Antipolygamists of the
nineteenth century likened husband and wives in a plural marriage to
slave master and enslaved subject.66 New England women’s rights
advocates of that century regarded polygamous marriages as no better
than Turkish harems, a practice designed to serve male lust without
women’s willing consent.67
In marked contrast to this view, the feminist historians Joan Smyth Iversen
and Julie Dunfey both offer persuasive evidence that nineteenth-century
plural marriage was not a uniquely gender-inegalitarian form of marriage.68
The Mormon women’s rights advocates at the time argued, with good
reason, that plural wives were in fact more liberated than their New
England counterparts. In terms of educational and economic opportunities,
civil and political rights, and autonomy within marriage, they rated quite
well in comparison to New England women in monogamous
marriages.69 Each plural wife lived in her own house, functioning as the
head of household and relying on her own judgment while her husband
was away on Church missions or staying with other wives.70 Married
Mormon women had the right to own property and sometimes owned
their homesteads.71 Plural marriage was designed to free wives from
some of the evils of male lust—protecting them against diseases that
might be brought home from visits to prostitutes and freeing pregnant
women from marital sexual duties.72 Mormon wives were substantially
more involved in economically contributing to their families than were
their eastern counterparts, because their economic contribution was
critical to both frontier society and their own support.73 They were
among the first women to vote in the United States,74 and half the first
enrollees in the University of Deseret (now the University of Utah) were
women.75 They entered plural marriages as well-educated women raised
65. JOHN STUART MILL, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN STUART MILL:
ETHICAL, POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS 291–92 (Marshall Cohen ed., 1961) (1863).
66. IVERSEN, supra note 35, 134–35; SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON
QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA 47–49 (2002).
67. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 142–44.
68. Dunfey, supra note 43; see also Joan Iversen, Feminist Implications of
Mormon Polygyny, 10 FEMINIST STUDIES 505–22 (1984); see also IVERSEN, supra note
35, at 53–75.
69. Iversen, supra note 68 at 510–11, 513.
70. Id. at 513–14.
71. Id. at 511.
72. Dunfey, supra note 43, at 528, 530, 531; Iversen, supra note 68, at 509.
73. Iversen, supra note 68, at 511; Rosenblum, supra note 8, at 79.
74. Iversen, supra note 68 at 505.
75. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 55.

1038

CALHOUN.DOC

[VOL. 42: 1023, 2005]

8/7/2019 12:41 PM

Who’s Afraid of Polygamous Marriage?
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

originally with the expectation of monogamous marriage.76 They were
able to exit marriage through divorce, and seventy-three percent of
divorce actions in Utah territory were by women.77
What these historical details remind us is that gender inequality is a
contingent, not a conceptual, feature of polygamy. Whether or not
polygamy is strongly connected to women’s inequality depends on at
least three sets of factors. First are the background social conditions that
affect women’s overall level of opportunity and self-determination. Do
women have basic civil and political rights including freedom to travel
and the right to own property? Do they have access to education?
Do they have the means to be economically self-supporting? Is there
readily available information about, and access to, alternative
ways of life? Such background conditions affect women’s level of
genuine freedom of choice to enter into polygamous relationships as
well as women’s status within those relationships. One reason why
Mormon women were able to mount a plausible defense of plural
marriage—in spite of the patriarchal ideological underpinnings of plural
marriage—was because their background conditions were favorable to
women’s autonomy.
Second, whether or not polygamy is strongly connected to women’s
inequality depends on the form that the social practice of polygamy
takes. By whom are plural spouses selected and courted? Whose consent is
presumed necessary? Who is presumed to have decisionmaking authority
(and over what) within the marriage? How do participants understand
their duties as a spouse? Is polygamy practiced only by heterosexuals
and only as polygyny?78 Or do lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals also
practice polygamy as well as heterosexual women in polyandrous
relationships?79 The customary social practices associated with polygamy
help determine the degree of gender equality, mutuality, and individual
autonomy versus unilateral dominance and gender inequality that is
likely to occur in actual polygamous marriages. As Nancy Rosenblum
observes, “There is no reason why egalitarian norms of property
distribution, parenting, and the division of domestic and market labor
76. Dunfey, supra note 43, at 529, 524.
77. IVERSEN, supra note 35, at 60.
78. Polygyny is defined as “[t]he condition or practice of having more than one
wife at the same time.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1198 (8th ed. 2004).
79. Polyandry is defined as “[t]he condition or practice of having more than one
husband at the same time.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1197 (8th ed. 2004).
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recommended by democratic theorists could not be adjusted for plural
marriage.”80
Finally, whether or not polygamy facilitates gender inequality depends
critically on the legal form it takes. To whom is polygamous civil
marriage available? Same-sex groups? One woman with multiple men?
Two women and two men? In a liberal political society governed by
norms of gender equality, polygamous civil marriage could not be
legally equated with polygyny,81 but would have to permit a variety of
gender configurations. In a society that recognizes same-sex marriages,
polygamy would necessarily extend to all-male or all-female polygamous
marriages. Moreover, if the idea that there is a single “head of household”
is not operative in legal conceptions of monogamous marriage, it would
be inconsistent to introduce that assumption into a legal conception of
polygamous marriage. Of equal importance is the question, from whom
is consent required? Liberal societies would not tolerate a form of civil
marriage which did not assign equal importance to the consent of all
spouses, and which did not offer the exit option of divorce to all spouses.
What rules govern divorce and property distribution? In a liberal society
that grants no-fault divorces to monogamous marriages, exit from
polygamous marriages would likewise have to be on a no-fault basis. In
short, the legal form of polygamous marriage determines the extent to
which assumptions about gender relations and sexual orientation are
encoded into marriage law. It also determines the level of required
formal consent for entrance into marriage and the availability of exit
options for disaffected spouses.
The quick dismissal of polygamy on grounds that it, unlike monogamy, is
distinctively gender-inegalitarian is the result of smuggling in a set of
unstated assumptions about the background social conditions for women,
the social practice of polygamy, and its likely legal form that would
render it inegalitarian, but that are implausible assumptions about plural
marriage in a liberal egalitarian democracy.
Opponents might object that, in fact, polygamy, as it is practiced
worldwide, tends to take forms that are oppressive to women. Permitting
polygamous civil marriage would thus open the doors to illiberal ethnic
groups in the United States practicing social forms of polygamy that are
oppressive to women. Two responses to this objection bear noting.
First, unless we are willing to also eliminate monogamous civil marriage
because it, too, sometimes takes social forms that are oppressive to women,
targeting polygamy for a special bar would involve the state in a clear
failure to exercise neutrality with respect to alternative conceptions of
80.
81.
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the good. Indeed, Justice Waite’s reason for rejecting polygamy in
Reynolds was driven in part by hostility to non-European cultures.82
“Polygamy,” he noted, “has always been odious among the northern and
western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon
Church, was almost exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of
African people.”83 Subsequent Supreme Court Justices rejected polygamy
out of hostility to non-Christian ways of life: “Bigamy and polygamy are
crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries,”84 and
polygamy is “a return to barbarism[;] [i]t is contrary to the spirit of
Christianity and of the civilization which Christianity has produced in
the Western world.”85
Second, the existence of ethnic or religious groups in the United States
that practice gender oppressive forms of polygamy is all the more reason
to extend civil marriage to polygamous groups. The social and legal
persecution of Mormon polygamy in the nineteenth century did not end
the social practice of polygamy.86 What it did do was to eliminate the
legal status of “wife” for all but first wives.87 As a result all secondary
wives lost their legal claim for support and their children became
illegitimate. Unless we are now willing to use the coercive force of the
law to ensure that there simply are no polygamous relationships, some
women will in fact participate in plural marriages in the United States.
Failure to extend civil marriage to plural marriages leaves them
unprotected by marriage and divorce law. Women who enter plural
marriages without the benefit of legal divorce have substantially
restricted exit options from those marriages, since they are not legally
entitled to make claims for alimony or fair property distribution. For
this reason, even those who are most committed to the belief that
polygamy will be practiced in gender-oppressive forms should think
82. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
83. Id.
84. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 341 (1890); see also BABST, supra note 21, at
96 (quoting Davis v. Beason and discussing the case’s relevance to “shadow
establishment”).
85. Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890); see also BABST, supra note 21, at 97 (quoting the case and
discussing the case’s relevance to “shadow establishment”). Babst argues that the
persistent appeal to Christian values in court rulings with respect to interracial,
polygamous, and same-sex marriage bars is evidence of what he calls a “shadow
establishment” of religion in U.S. judicial practice.
86. See supra note 20.
87. Dunfey, supra note 43, at 525.
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twice about insisting on using the denial of civil marriage as a way to
deter that practice.
V. CONCLUSION
The silence about polygamy on the part of same-sex marriage advocates
is a mistake—at least in academic circles, because the historical practice
of polygamy is a substantial reason for rejecting the claim that there is a
millennias-long tradition of defining marriage as between one man and
one woman. In addition, reflection on the similarities between the
polygamy and same-sex marriage debates helps to illuminate the larger
social issue of how to satisfy individuals’ multiple relational needs and
whether the state should endorse a single form of marriage. Finally, the
supposedly reductio force of “And why not also polygamy?” challenges
to same-sex marriages are most effectively met by challenging their
underlying assumptions about the nature of polygamy.

1042

